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I98 Serif A. Mardin
then the Revolution involved a similarly inclusive ideological system challenging the former one.' If we add to this that 'revolutionary theories join fundamental change and the resort to violence as elements to be taken into account'2 we have the main elements that have to be sought in an upheaval to be able to call it a revolution according to Tocqueville.
If the French Revolution is seen as revolutionary because violence suffused it, and, in particular, marked the methods used by its political leaders, and if it is adopted as a benchmark for comparisons with the Turkish Revolution, then the Turkish Revolution was and is no revolution. This comparison is not as artificial as would seem at first sight, and the contrast between the two movements underscores characteristic features of the Turkish Revolution. Such a comparative perspective is, therefore, used throughout this study. The Turkish Revolution is, in fact, the name given to a period of Turkish history of indefinite length during which the Turkish political system was transformed, but not by unleashed social violence. One feels less assured in stating that, in Turkey, the break with the preceding political system was gradual, but this too can be argued. When the Sultanate was abolished and later the Republic established, this caused much intellectual commotion, but 'sudden and violent overthrow of an established political order'3 was not involved. Neither were the usual sequels of such violence to be seen: there was no real Turkish Vendee, and no body of conspiring emigres.4 As to the social system, not only was there no short-term severe violence (and corresponding violent dislocation) but even the pervasiveness of the dislocation is questionable. Whether the Turkish Revolution is understood to cover the years I908-38, or 19I9-23, or the period between I9I9 and I929, or even later years, systematic violence was not its characteristic.
The revolutionary activities of the leaders of the Turkish Revolution were marked by controlled political intimidation rather than terror, and there were only a very few 'political' executions during the entire process. The Turkish Courts of Independence, the equivalents of the Committee of the Public Safety, appear mild when compared to their French parallels. Their victims seem to have been mostly members of the lower classes and not aristocrats. The Jacobin aspects of Republican policy-a term which has had some vogue in Turkey-are more misleading than illuminating, and there are definitely no Turkish Robespierres.
The French Revolution was not only violent because of the violence of its leaders, but because it harnessed behind it the revolutionary mob, sans culottes or castle-burners. Here there is even less of a similarity between the two revolutions. The Turkish Revolution was not a movement buttressed by mass support. The Turkish War of Independence, which was the first stage of the Turkish Revolution, had much support from the lower classes in so far as it embodied resistance to a despised invader. The civil aims of the revolutionaries, i.e. the political and social modernization of Turkey, however, were not paralleled by popular demands. The Turkish transformation did not originate in the thrust of the masses. Even if a more sceptical view of mass support is taken and mass participation is seen as the mobilization of the masses by the elite, even then the Revolution cannot be characterized as a mass phenomenon. At any rate, there are no Turkish equivalents of the tricoteuses watching justice being carried out, of castle-burning, and of the revolutionary commune radicalizing the policy of the Revolution.
If we look at the French Revolution from the vantage points of the targets it attacked, then, too, there is no striking similarity with the Turkish Revolution. The upper stratum which the Turkish Revolution disestablished consisted first and foremost of the imperial dynasty. Another structure aimed at was the palace, the Sultan's staff. But the extent to which the Sultan had been shorn of his prerogatives, already a decade before the instauration of the Republic, has been extensively described by Halid Ziya U?akligil. In his memoirs, he shows that already in 1909 the palace as an institution was a ghost, a myth only kept alive by Sultan Abdiilhamid II's personal idiosyncrasies.I Sultan Hamid used it as a center for administration and communication and as a convenient peg for sinecures. His successor, Sultan Mehmed V Re?ad, collaborated with the Young Turks in disengaging the palace from politics. Sultan Vahdettin tried to re-establish his influence after World War I, but he was working with an institution that had been emptied by politics. As to the Turkish equivalents of battles with the nobility, of virulent attacks on holders of feudal privileges and heartless rent-squeezers who ransacked family archives to reimpose long-forgotten dues on their peasant dependants, here the picture becomes totally unfamiliar. A parallel to the French onslaught against the privileged exists only in a much looser context. If the French Revolution is seen as the thrust of an emerging elite who had been excluded from the privileges of the nobility,2 then leaders in the Turkish Revolution had comparable grievances. But in Turkey the struggle was an intra-bureaucratic one of much narrower scope. Except for a small cone on top of the hierarchical pyramid, not much of an adjustment of class relations was involved. At most it was a new generation of bureaucrats who were replacing an older one.
This dynamic is intelligible only in terms of the meaning of 'class' for Turkish very embryonic and scattered in Turkey.I The groups that had the greatest weight in determining policy in the Ottoman Empire were those who, in some form or other, were integrated in the political structure. The form of this integration and the extent to which economic formations acquired autonomy in Ottoman society varied markedly in the centuries that preceded the establishment of the Republic. But groups shaped by market processes were unable to displace officials as those primarily responsible for the conduct of the affairs of the Empire, political or economic.2 At its inception, the Ottoman Empire had been a patrimonial structure with the Sultan as supreme arbiter, while his personal staff was in charge of the administration of the empire. With time, many transformations, which cannot be described in detail here, had come about in this order. Suffice it to say that such features of patrimonialism as the myth of a Sultan who was a father to his subjects, an economic system where the protection of the consumer was a paramount concern, a system of law which was diffuse and where administrative fiat played an important role, lived even at the end of the nineteenth century.3 More subject to change had been the staff of the patrimonial ruler, which started modernization and began by modernizing itself and the army. tection of 'life, property and honor'. These charters had the felicitous side-effect of protecting their own property. There thus grew up a new social set which was able to perpetuate itself more easily than earlier generations of officials. More important than the inheritability of wealth, however, was the transmission to succeeding generations of a new style of life. This western veneer could be monopolized by the upper officials and their families because the new ways were foreign to Ottoman-Turkish culture and because educational mobility was very limited. Officials' sons had a head start that was hard to equal. A fluent knowledge of French and alla Franca (Western) social graces was the foremost requisite of advancement; and who had a better opportunity to learn them than children of the Tanzimat? But within two generations the game got more difficult. Advances in technology and human organization, and the superiority they provided in power confrontation, were noticed in Turkey.' These new demands of power could no longer be filled by a knowledge of diplomatic correspondence or even by a vague familiarity with the tortuous path of European cabinets. Professionalism had high priority beginning with the i87os and Sultan Abdiilhamid II, for all his conservative leanings, saw the writing on the wall. Most of the schools from which the revolutionary bureaucrats graduated were given new foundations during his reign (I876-I9o9).2 These schools produced a new type of official somewhat contemptuous of the earlier generalists and of their dandified sons.
Thus the social undercurrent of the last years of the reign of Sultan Abdiilhamid II was the warfare between officials who acceded to positions because they were part of the Tanzimat set and those whose advancement-or lack of it-was based on merit. In a way this was the last phase of an endemic clash between achievement and ascription in the history of the Ottoman Empire.
The revolutionaries, the Young Turks, were persons who were convinced that they knew more and better than those who were in charge of the interests of the Empire. Their revolution was carried out in I908 and its This innovation did not realize its full potential because and to the extent that some aspects of the traditional ideology of the state still affected the Young Turks and the founders of the Republic. Not the least important among the stimuli which led both to the Young Turk Revolt and the Turkish Revolution was the ancient ideal of the preservation of the state. Systems for training bureaucrats might have changed, but the Ottoman tradition that the state counted more than did individuals had remained. This is one point where the structure of the Ottoman Empire diverged from Weber's type of patrimonialism. Gradually, concern for the state was transformed into an ideology of nascent nationalisms. In the sense that they had no real, new revolutionary theory but were just refurbishing ideals of the preservation of the state, the fathers of the Turkish Revolution showed one further failing as revolutionaries by Tocqueville' standards. Among Tocqueville's criteria of evaluation, the use of violence, which we have described as absent in the Turkish Revolution, was the foremost. A revolutionary theory was the second of his principles which up to this point we have not been able to detect in Turkey. Tocqueville's third principle, change in the 'essential principle of society', also seems, on the surface, to be missing in our case. We shall see that this is only half true.
The Turkish Revolution was not the instrument of a discontented bourgeoisie, it did not ride on a wave of peasant dissatisfaction with the social order, and it did not have as target the sweeping away of feudal privileges, but it did take as a target the values of the Ottoman ancien regime. In this sense it was a revolutionary movement. The characteristic is sufficiently interesting to justify a pause in the argument presented here to examine it in some detail.
All revolutionary movements, to the extent that they question and attempt to destroy existing social-structural arrangements also try to disestablish the value systems of ancien regimes. The attempt to disestablish the Catholic Church together with the pressures to make its personnel conform to the new ideology are features of the French Revolution which are well known. The simultaneous attempt to replace religion by civisme is also familiar. But when destroying the values of the ancien regime assumes the overwhelming importance that it acquired during the Turkish Revolution, and when this is accompanied by fewer blows dealt to the infra-structure, then something of particular interest seems to be involved. It should be added that this approach was that of the radical faction of the revolutionaries led by Atatiirk which eventually came to direct the Revolution. For the Turkish Revolutionaries, the symbolic system of society, culture, seems to have had a relatively greater attraction as a target than the social structure itself. And within culture, religion seems to have been singled out as the core of the system. By the same token, the 'moderate' wing also relied on a cultural argument to define its position, and it often criticized the religious policies of the radicals as extreme. The radical's strategy of change begins to make sense if used in connection with a long-standing characteristic of Islamic societies. According to this view, Islam has a more direct relation to the content of social structure than many other religions. This has been expressed by Orientalists,' Anthropologists,2 and even by casual observers. In the Ottoman Empire it was particularly strong, and part of this went back to Ottoman historical experience. The Ottoman Empire was founded by a group of warrior-knights, the Gazis, who carried the burden of its expansion in its formative years.3 Underlying this formation were nomadic Turkic groups whose economic basis was that of the redistribution of spoils in potlatch-like institutions. When the Ottoman state gradually assumed the feature of an urban-centered empire, the building of centralized institutions had to rely on a system less generous in terms of redistribution.4 A surplus had to be taken by the central power. Thus, for many years the heirs of the Gazi tradition, who objected to this change, and the state were locked in an endemic, if only periodically overt, struggle. The Gazi team gathered around itself nomadic structures, the successors of the religious leaders of the Gazi, heterodox Islam, and the remains of the Central Asian culture. On the other side were the officials and the supporters of the state religion. With time, a compromise was achieved between these 'popular' and 'elite' structures, and an amalgamation of the two took place. But popular religion now institutionalized in the form of dervish orders and its leaders, who had rendered the services of colonizing and settling many parts of the empire, among others, continued to function as a link between the lower classes and the elite.5 They provided educational institutions at lower levels, also 'parallel universities' for persons who could not go on to the great religious universities in Istanbul. They acted as a center for cultural training for minor state positions and for the religious establishment. They partly controlled charitable foundations; they also disposed of many economic resources, partly the result of gifts. The 'monasteries' of the Turkish mystic orders owned part of the income of hundreds of villages.6 Altogether, they provided cultural services, functioned as a channel for social mobility, and took on responsibility for various forms of social assistance. Wherever the aloof state failed they moved in. For the population at large religion was a moral prop, something to lean on, a source of consolation, a patterning of life; for the ruling elite it was in addition, and probably much more, a matter related to the legitimacy of the state. Both groups could at times neglect religion or by-pass it, but the form of this bypassing was different: for the masses it consisted of breaking religious taboos and then atoning for it later; for the ruling it consisted in pushing religion into the background when required by secular political purposes. 'Religion and the state are twins' was the way in which this close association was expressed, but in the Ottoman empire one of the twins could often become more equal. To the extent that Islam was 'bifurcated', its use as linkage in the Ottoman empire was only partially successful: a universe of discourse was established, but the lower legitimation offered by the framework. The 'little man's' religion was thus placed in an ambiguous situation: tolerated but not secure. It was this tension which Atatiirk hoped would work in favor of secularization in the long run.
The preceding provides an explanation of the Turkish Republican intolerance of the values of the ancien regime as a threat to its existence. But this 'idealistic' attitude is one which appears in other policies of the Turkish Revolution. Atatiirk has been much criticized recently for spending too much effort on trying to change people's ideas. These critics point out that the extraordinary amount of energy spent on elaborating national consciousness and historical myths and on changing headgear and dress was not paralleled by an equal effort to create an economic basis for the republic.
But his attempts to create a new ideology had two distinct dimensions. The first one of these has often been described in studies of modernization. We know that ideological change is an area on which many Asian societies on the way to modernization have focused intensely. The usual explanations of the function of such ideologies has been that they are guides to the ideal polity of the future.'
People need a map to orient them in building the new polity. My own contention here-somewhat reminiscent of that of Geertz-is that the modernizing ideology has also had the function of grappling with an already important traditional ideology. The new men have to accept a fight in the religious arena because this area is unusually important in the traditional system.2
All of the attempts to change the 'superstructure' of Turkish society have thus to be understood in the light of two features: first, the real importance of the superstructure for Ottoman society and secondly, the difficulty for someone raised within such a structure to realize that the importance of the superstructure was idiosyncratic to his society. The Turkish Revolution was, then, primarily a revolution of values, but one in which the revolutionaries still showed the influence of their Ottoman-Islamic background. Their innovations, such as the introduction of a new civil code and the reform in the status of women, were directed at changing prevailing values, but it was their Ottoman heritage which obliged them to selectively direct their energies to the destruction of social norms. They were at a disadvantage even ?'erif A. Mardin here in that they did not realize that legislating for the family does not mean bringing new values to existing families.
But their stance was characteristic in that the radical elite had legislated at the level of the elite and given little thought to the 'little' culture. In other countries of Asia where the elite was less cut-off from popular culture there was greater concern with such popular values.
All of this does not mean that the revolutionaries gave no importance to economics. As observers who had witnessed the economic weakness of the Ottoman empire, they were well aware of the importance of a modern, prosperous economy. They were also extremely sensitive about having the controls of this economy placed in Turkish hands. But their image of modern Turkey was not centered in electrification or the abolition of rich peasants as a class. Proletkult posters of square-jawed workers fulfilling their norm was not their vision of the future, although in the I930s this did become the vogue for awhile. Their focus was a new national identity.
One point which has emerged from this survey is that the so-called Turkish Revolution goes as far back as the Young Turk Revolution, and that the foundations of the Republican regime were laid in I908.
Only a short time ago the origins of the Turkish revolutionary movement in a subcategory of the ruling elite would have added to the aspects that disqualified it as a 'real' revolution. This is also true by Tocqueville's standards since he traced the basic instability at the root of revolution to 'a contradiction between the structure of civil society and the make-up of the political regime'.' Such a line of thought has also been prominent in the Marxist analysis of revolution and in modern attempts at typology: revolutions occur when the social and economic substructure bursts the political superstructure. In a recent article Gillis has shown that this is a one-sided and incomplete account of European revolutions.z Part of the preparation for revolution is that numerous elements in the bureaucracy and the army -parts of the existing ruling group -become alienated. Gillis goes on to illustrate this for 1789 and 1848.
To the extent that it fits this model of revolution, the Turkish revolution is thus belatedly being partly vindicated as having some aspects of a 'real' revolution. But what is most interesting about Gillis's approach is that he uncovers how closely linked with the concept of 'civil society' our understanding of revolution has been. Marx, in so far as he used the concept of civil society as an antithesis to the state, falls in the same category of categorizers. Both Tocqueville and Marx gave explanations of revolution that depended on the presence of an autonomous civil society. This was not the case in the Ottoman Empire.3
